Collection of Interesting, Worth Reading NEWS, ANALYSIS & ARTICLES

Back in the early stages of the financial crisis, wags joked that our trade with China had turned out to be fair and balanced after all: They sold us poison toys and tainted seafood; we sold them fraudulent securities.

But these days, both sides of that deal are breaking down. On one side, the world’s appetite for Chinese goods has fallen off sharply. China’s exports have plunged in recent months and are now down 26 percent from a year ago. On the other side, the Chinese are evidently getting anxious about those securities.

But China still seems to have unrealistic expectations. And that’s a problem for all of us.

The big news last week was a speech by Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of China’s central bank, calling for a new “super-sovereign reserve currency.”

The paranoid wing of the Republican Party promptly warned of a dastardly plot to make America give up the dollar. But Mr. Zhou’s speech was actually an admission of weakness. In effect, he was saying that China had driven itself into a dollar trap, and that it can neither get itself out nor change the policies that put it in that trap in the first place.

Some background: In the early years of this decade, China began running large trade surpluses and also began attracting substantial inflows of foreign capital. If China had had a floating exchange rate — like, say, Canada — this would have led to a rise in the value of its currency, which, in turn, would have slowed the growth of China’s exports.

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NOBODY talks about “decoupling” any more. Instead, emerging economies are sinking alongside developed ones. In 2008 emerging stock markets fell by more than those in the rich world, and financial woes forced countries such as Hungary, Latvia and Pakistan to go cap in hand to the IMF. Taiwan’s exports have plunged by 42% over the past year, and South Korea’s by 17%; even China’s have shrunk. Singapore’s GDP fell by an annualised 12.5% in the fourth quarter of 2008, its biggest drop on record. Is this the end of the emerging-market boom?

Over the five years to 2007, emerging economies grew by an annual average of more than 7%. But in the past three months their total output may have fallen slightly, according to JPMorgan, as the fall in exports was exacerbated by a sudden drying up in trade finance. For 2008 as a whole, average growth in emerging economies was still above 6%, but recent private-sector forecasts suggest that this could slip to less than 4% this year. That is grim compared with the recent past, though still robust set against an expected 2% decline in the GDP of the G7 countries.

Short-term pain is only to be expected. But some economists argue that emerging markets’ longer-term prospects have been badly hurt by the global financial crisis. From Brazil to China, they claim, the boom was driven largely by exports to American consumers, easy access to cheap capital and high commodity prices. All three props have now collapsed. In particular, as America’s housing bust causes households to save more, they will import less over the coming years. This could reduce emerging economies’ future growth rates.

Just making a bullet list of all the items that developing countries and poor nations got at the 2009 G20 summit in London.

Funding Pledges:

If IMF have more money to lend then it means that poor countries are less reliant on Western nations when they get into trouble and need aid. Poor countries will also be less reliant on the value of the US dollar because IMF has its own accounting currency, SDR, which is a basket of major currencies such as dollar, euro, yen and pound.

JAPAN developed rapidly after American gunboats opened it to trade in the late 19th century. Within 40 years, Emperor Meiji led his once-feudal country into the modern world economically (and, alas, militarily). To do so, the state bought Western technology such as factory machines, railroads and telegraph lines. But until the turn of the 20th century it did so by eschewing foreign loans, which were equated with a loss of sovereignty.

How did a poor country like Japan obtain the foreign currency to pay for such products? The answer was exports: first, of light industrial goods such as raw silk and pottery; later, of heavier materials, including steel and chemicals. It was a huge success. In the 1860s Japan’s small-scale cotton-textile industry was nearly decimated by European imports. By 1914, however, after buying automated cotton spinners, the country sold half of its yarn production abroad, which accounted for one-quarter of the world’s cotton yarn exports.

Thus the “Asian model” of export-led growth was born. The region was inspired by Japan’s lead before the second world war and its economic resurrection afterward. In the 1960s Asia’s four “tiger economies” (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea) imitated Japan and flourished. South Korea’s bureaucrats, for example, protected domestic firms and funneled them cheap loans under the condition that they exported their wares.

China also boomed after opening its economy in 1978. Its “special economic zones” were designed to attract foreign capital—initially from Chinese businessmen in Hong Kong and Taiwan—to build factories for export production. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and later Vietnam all forged similar export-led paths to growth.

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TO LOSE one decade may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose two looks like carelessness. Japan’s economy stagnated in the 1990s after its stockmarket and property bubbles burst, but its more recent economic performance looks even more troubling. Industrial production plunged by 38% in the year to February, to its lowest level since 1983. Real GDP fell at an annualised rate of 12% in the fourth quarter of 2008, and may have declined even faster in the first three months of this year. The OECD forecasts that Japan’s GDP will shrink by 6.6% in 2009 as a whole, wiping out all the gains from the previous five years of recovery.

If that turns out to be true, Japan’s economy will have grown at an average of 0.6% a year since it first stumbled in 1991. Thanks to deflation as well, the value of GDP in nominal terms in the first quarter of this year probably fell back to where it was in 1993. For 16 years the economy has, in effect, gone nowhere.

Was Japan’s seemingly strong recovery of 2003-07 an illusion? And why has the global crisis hit Japan much harder than other rich economies? Popular wisdom has it that Japan is overly dependent on exports, but the truth is a little more complicated. The share of exports in Japan’s GDP is much smaller than in Germany or China and until recently was on a par with that in America. During the ten years to 2001, net exports contributed nothing to Japan’s GDP growth. Then exports did surge, from 11% of GDP to 17% last year. If exporters’ capital spending is included, net exports accounted for almost half of Japan’s total GDP growth in the five years to 2007.






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The year 1989 reshaped the world. Its news stories - from Tiananmen Square to the fall of the Berlin Wall - are now historical marker posts. BBC Diplomatic Editor Brian Hanrahan watched many of the events at first hand, and will retrace his steps this year.

One of the paradoxes of 1989 was that communism was destroyed by its own system. I'm not thinking here of the weight of economic collapse, which hollowed out the whole Soviet Bloc.

Painful though it would have been, the countries of Eastern Europe and their Soviet overlord could have limped on for many years - their people suffering and their influence declining. They would have been marginalised but left alone until they eventually collapsed, probably with much bloodshed.

What short-circuited this process was the Stalinist power structure of the Soviet Union. The system allowed the general secretary of the Communist Party to acquire almost total control of the party and the country.

By 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev had consolidated his power base and was able to drive through his own policies regardless of the opposition among his colleagues.

Read the full article HERE.

Two forces that until recently turbo-charged US consumer spending—growing household debt and a falling savings rate—have gone into reverse. In late 2008, as households started reducing their indebtedness and saving more, consumption tumbled.

New research from the McKinsey Global Institute shows that the economic impact of further US consumer deleveraging will depend on income growth. Without it, each percentage point increase in the savings rate would reduce spending by more than $100 billion—a serious drag on any recovery. Relatively healthy income growth, on the other hand, would help households reduce their debt burden without trimming consumption as much.

The significance of any fall in consumption could be profound. US consumers have accounted for more than three-quarters of US GDP growth since 2000 and for more than one-third of global growth in private consumption since 1990. These trends were fueled by a surge in household debt, particularly after 2000 (Exhibit 1), and a decline in the personal savings rate—to a low of –0.7 percent, in 2005. From 2000 to 2007, US household debt grew as much, relative to income, as it had during the previous 25 years.


Read the full article HERE. You may need to register at the McKinsey website. Its Free.

Regulators struggling to fix the world’s troubled financial institutions may take heart from the experience of China’s large state-owned banks. In the late 1990s, Chinese state lenders were all but insolvent, with nonperforming loan ratios at many banks exceeding 50 percent. A decade later, China’s state banks have found their footing—and have managed to keep it amid a global financial crisis that has their European and US counterparts reeling. The bad-loan ratio has been reduced, and this year China’s state banks expect solid profits and continued rapid growth—despite the global downturn. What’s more, top bank executives express confidence in their capacity to heed government instructions to boost lending while effectively controlling credit risk.

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) is generally regarded as the strongest of China’s state-owned bank giants. It is also the largest bank by market capitalization and total profits—both in China and the world—with total assets of more than $1.4 trillion. ICBC chairman Jiang Jianqing met recently with McKinsey’s Dominic Barton, Yi Wang, and Mei Ye to share his thoughts on corporate governance, risk management, and the origins of the financial crisis.


Read the full article HERE. You may need to register at the McKinsey website. Its Free.

For the foreseeable future, the global financial-services sector will be wrestling with the grim realities of credit losses, deleveraging, and challenges to traditional business models. With dramatic industry restructuring already underway and a clear need for players to concentrate on the here and now, it would be easy to lose sight of a nascent but significant long-term opportunity: facilitating carbon trading.

By placing a value on greenhouse gas emissions, regulators have created a new asset class—carbon allowances. The European Union, for instance, issues allowances to companies in the industrial and energy sectors, stipulating that companies can emit capped levels of carbon emissions during the year. Enterprises that overshoot their allowances can buy supplementary ones from companies that have a surplus. China is discussing plans for a similar scheme, and the United States may introduce one soon as well.

Many banks, including Barclays, Merrill Lynch, and Deutsche Bank, already profit from trade in this new asset class, which had a market value of about €65 billion in 2007. By participating in those transactions, banks earned around €500 million in revenues last year. Trading volume could grow to €2 trillion by 2020—more than double the size of the global commodities derivatives market...

Read the full article HERE. You may need to register at the McKinsey website. Its Free.

Climate change has businesses, governments, and nonprofits examining how to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases while still maintaining economic growth. In plotting the course to a low-carbon economy, they will weigh a number of methods for addressing the various risks and opportunities. Carbon capture and storage (CCS)—or more accurately, the sequestration of carbon dioxide—is an important topic in the emerging field of climate change. It represents one possible approach for stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gases—although there are many economic, technical, and legal barriers to its implementation. As background for informed discussion, McKinsey offer an interactive depiction of the technologies involved in CCS.

Read the full article HERE. You may need to register at the McKinsey website. Its Free.

The recent bailout of Romania by the International Monetary Fund puts the spotlight back on the East European block of countries and what it means for the Western European banking sector. If evidence is anything to go by, things are turning for the worse. In fact, if a block of countries could be termed 'sub-prime', Eastern Europe seems to qualify as the countries seem to have been battered and bruised big time by the ongoing global financial turmoil.

With the financial contagion going beyond the developed West, few countries seem to be as hard hit as these are. These are the countries that had earlier benefited tremendously from the cheap global credit which helped them finance the consumption and investment boom.

They ratcheted up large external debts to fund their ambitious growth. And now they are feeling the pain. The freezing of money markets in the United States and Western Europe, followed by a sharp increase in credit risk subsequent to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, drove investors into a liquidity scramble.

In Eastern Europe, these events translated into capital repatriations, lower foreign investment and higher risk premiums. The slowdown in the developed economies and, finally, the onset of the recession in the second part of last year brought a fall in Eastern European exports, which further exacerbated the downfall.

This is amply evident from the fact that for most of these economies, current account balance has deteriorated like nobody's business over the last few years.

In fact, IMF data shows that, on an average, the current account deficit for this region more than doubled between 2003 and 2008.

Consequently, the region's currencies also plummeted. Banks in Hungary and the Baltic states fueled consumer boom in recent years by lending heavily in foreign currency, most notably Euro and the Swiss Franc. Sometime, more than 50 per cent of a local bank's loan portfolio was in foreign currency.

Consumers were demanding loan in foreign currency simply because these carried lower interest rates. Things were fine as long as the currency remained stable or even appreciating. But a sharp depreciation in the values of the local currency over the past year has increased the loan burden substantially, leading to deeper recessions and the banks facing heavy loss. Not surprisingly these economies are skating downhill.

Hungary and Ukraine has already turned to the IMF for multi-billion-dollar bailouts, and Romania turned out to be third in the list as IMF said on Wednesday (March 25, 2009) that it would come to the rescue of Romania as part of a Euro 20 billion financing package to help it weather the financial crisis.

Next in line seem to be the Baltic countries which are suffering one of the most severe recessions of any region. Estonia and Latvia are expected to have seen their economy recording negative growth in 2009, while for Latvia the growth rate was down by nearly 60 per cent.

This is a frightening development indeed. As mentioned earlier, we are virtually staring at a group of countries that are looking increasingly like sub-prime.

Recently, Credit Suisse released a scorecard which is called Vulnerability Scorecard for countries. This scorecard ranks a number of countries around the world on factors usually taken into consideration when assessing the credit quality of sovereign debt. The same is produced below.

Not surprisingly Iceland is at the top. This country has become a poster boy of doom invited by reckless policies. But what is more important to note is that in the top 14 countries in the above lists, eight are from Eastern Europe. Fortunately for us Indians, we are in a much better position at 25.

This brings to fore, the question of the likely implication of the deteriorating condition in Eastern Europe on the Western European financial sector.

Before we go into this, a brief recounting of history is in order. In Eastern Europe, banks were privatised during the 1990s and early 2000s. The preferred method of privatization was the sale of a majority stake in a local state-owned bank to a big foreign banking group, deemed capable of restructuring it and making it profitable.

Consequently, nowadays most banks in the region -- and especially in those countries that are now members of the European Union -- are owned by big Western Europe groups. The Eastern European subsidiaries of all of these banks, often among the largest in their home countries, form a significant share of their assets.

What also led to this scenario is the European regulation which has allowed European banks to take on much more leverage than their American counterparts.

In Europe, unlike in the United States, it is only risk-weighted assets which matter to the regulators, not the total leverage ratio. European banks can therefore apply a lot more leverage than their US counterparties, provided they load their balance sheets with higher rated assets.

This is what they have been doing. Problem is, what was AAA couple of years earlier is possibly a junk now. And, clearly that's a problem.

Data from Bank for International Settlements (BIS) puts things in perspective.

And because of this huge exposure, the growing crisis in Eastern Europe is now proving critical to their financial health. Furthermore, a fall of any one of these banks due to losses on their operations in Eastern Europe will add a new threat to the stability of the European financial system.

The next chart produced, identifies the Western European countries that have more exposure to East Europe.

Going by this, Austria is the country most at risk. It is followed by Germany and Italy. However, to understand the real problem, it is important to bring the size of the economy to focus which will give the extent of risk at relative level. Doing so brings about an interesting situation.

Clearly, Austria is the country that is at maximum risk with exposure topping 60 per cent. Their top four exposures are in Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. Of these, Romania and Hungary are already facing problems.

Banks of other Western European countries are at relatively less risk. However, at 20 per cent plus, Belgium and Sweden are still at high risk. Sweden, in particular, is at more risk because they have maximum exposure to Baltic countries which has been impacted the most by the recent turmoil.

To conclude, it turns out that Eastern Europe has now become the sub-prime borrower of Western Europe. As was the case with the US mortgage borrowers, both the public and private sector in Eastern European countries are highly leveraged while falling currencies and declining output mean lower income in the immediate future.

Because of the deepening recession in the United States and Western Europe, the Eastern European countries are moving quickly into negative growth rates as well. And with them comes the increased risk of default on debts. Seemingly, there is a long way to go before all the risk plays out in Europe.

This story almost certainly force us think that is the building more debt ridden society over last few decades a disaster in making for the future? May be or may be not. At least a columnist of Reuters, John Kemp, thinks that it is a disaster in making.

Here is the snapshot of the data the author talks about. Just look at the table below and draw your own conclusions or read the full story HERE.

Table: United States Public and Private Debt

The global trade is declining. WTO estimates that the global trade will decline 9% this year against a 2% increase in 2008. It was even at a 6% increase 15 months ago. Is it because of protectionism that made the 1930s recession a great depression or is it because of falling demand. Thankfully it is because of falling demand.

UK's Story (March 25th 2009):
In a reminder of how bad things are across the globe, the U.K. failed to find enough buyers for $2.55 billion (1.75 billion pounds) in gilt-edge bonds, Bloomberg is reporting. This is debt that the U.K. is attempting to sell to raise money to help the country out of its recession. The snub marks the third time in the past 10 years Britain has been unable to complete a debt auction. This is bad news on its face, but it could be worse news going forward: Prime Minister Gordon Brown hopes to sell $214 billion worth of debt this year and an additional $215 billion next year. The Treasury was able to sell $2.4 billion worth of the 40-year securities, leaving some $100 million worth of debt unsold. The failed auction could be a bad sign for a number of nations that hope to sell debt to raise money to dig out of the recession. The United States plans to triple its debt sales this year to a record $2.5 trillion. Germany, by comparison, plans a far more modest $470 billion debt offering this year.

Ireland's Story (March 25th 2009):
Ireland's successful sale of €1bn in bonds, in its first auction since 2005, showed investor concern about the risk of default is overblown and the securities offer value, investment bank ING said yesterday. The National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) sold the bonds to raise cash as the economic slump hoovers up tax revenue. Irish 10-year bonds rose after the auction, reducing the spread between the securities and German benchmark notes to the narrowest in three weeks. The cost of insuring against a government default also declined, credit-default swap prices showed. "This is an opportunity to buy," said Padhraic Garvey, head of investment-grade bond strategy at ING in Amsterdam. "Ireland's bond spread overshot and talk about the country potentially defaulting on its debt was just ridiculous and far-fetched." The three-year €300m bond was 3.8 times oversubscribed while the 10-year €700m was 2.7 times over, the NTMA said. "The healthy demand is really good news," said Rossa White, chief economist at Davy Stockbrokers. Moreover, spreads on the 2020 note have tightened by 30 basis points in the secondary market already, he added. Analysts added that the CDS went too far in February when worries about Ireland were at their highest, and it has now converged with the cash market. The spread between Irish and German 10-year debt narrowed 24 basis points yesterday to 249. The average spread during the past 10 years between Irish and German 10-year debt was 18 basis points, according to Bloomberg analysis. However, market watchers added that the key event in the Irish economic calender is the April 7 Budget. "If hard decisions are made on current Government spending, we could see a significant further tightening of Irish spreads vis-a-vis Germany," Mr White said. Although this was the first auction in some time, Ireland has already had several fund raisings via syndication whereby governments use banks to find buyers for the securities rather than offer the debt through auction. In January and February the NTMA raised €10bn in two bond sales via syndication. Other commentators were also cheered by the latest news. "Ireland chose a fantastic time to put their toes back in the water," said Peter Chatwell, a fixed-income strategist in London at Calyon, the investment-banking unit of Credit Agricole SA. "Risk appetite has improved and the spread is pulling in, suggesting the auction inspired a lot of confidence."

Analysis:
Clearly amidst the doom and gloom this is excellent news, without wanting to understate the serious challenges that lie ahead - they obviously see something we don't! But the markets seem to be suggesting that either Brown is complete nuts if the UK cannot raise 1.75bn at a gilt auction and he is hoping for 150bn of borrowing or Ireland is taking the pain quick and fast for their liking. Me thinks the latter is of utmost importance. Ireland is x4 over subscribed on it's debt raising! This is extremely good news. The markets are willing to lend to trusty Ireland in vast amounts. The borrowing plans of the UK look shaky and ridiculous now and the risk of default has suddenly shifted from Ireland onto UK. Mervin King, the head of the Bank of England, before this auction warned that not only where the public finances out of control but that a second stimulus plan was unaffordable. This means the UK, having failed to raise debt, is having to print that money right now...that means inflation is becoming a risk in a declining economy which in turn raises the horrid specter of hyper inflation should the BOE go too far. It is all a big game of chess. The UK has to take action should a second gilt raising exercise fail and dramatically cut down on spending like Ireland has done. Brown won't be able to keep his stimulus in full after this fiasco. Unlike Ireland which has received a huge boost - this was a pretty big warning shot for the UK. "Don't take the markets for granted".

The plan announced this week by the US Treasury secretary Tim Geithner is designed to clear away a large load of so-called “toxic assets” clogging up America’s financial system. But what are these assets? And how will the plan work?

Financial Times provides a very good video explanation that even the beginners can understand.

McKinsey mapped the decline and recovery of many sectors in past 4 recessions. According to the analysis, McKinsey says

Particularly in hard times, it’s crucial to make the right assumptions in strategic planning. Despite claims that the current recession is “unprecedented,” it seems to be following many of the same patterns the four previous ones did—patterns that may offer insights into the performance of sectors in the coming months and years. All four recessions, like the current one, began with falling sales and EBITA in the consumer discretionary sector and three with similar declines in IT. Consumer staples didn’t suffer significantly in the last three or health care in the last two. The energy sector was among the latest to be hit in three of the recessions, though it was among the latest to recover in all four of them. The exhibit shows the sequence of decline and recovery in these and other sectors.